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Case No,
14505

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title to a parcel of property
located in Park City, Utah, in which the Supreme Court, after
an appeal, ordered the plaintiff's complaint dismissed with
prejudice and held that the deed, which conveyed the property
here involved from Summit County to the defendants Butkovich,
was valid.

Following the appeal the defendants Butkovich filed

a motion in the lower court requesting an order dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint and quieting title to the property in the
Butkoviches.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the hearing on the defendants1 motion, Summit County,
though not a party to this action, appeared in court to inform
the court that it desired to claim title to the property here
involved.

The lower court ordered the defendants to join Summit

County as a third-party defendant.

After the joinder and the

filing of a counterclaim by Summit County, the defendants filed
a motion for summary judgment.

The lower court granted the

motion for summary judgment and entered a decree quieting title
to the property in the defendants Butkovich.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The third-party defendant-appellant, Summit County, seeks
a reversal of the decree entered by the lower court. Respondents,
the Butkoviches, seek to have the lower court's decree affirmed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts is laced with many
allegations which do not appear in the record, with some facts
which are irrelevant to this appeal, with argument and innuendo
and, therefore, respondents will present their own statement of
facts.
The defendants-respondents Butkovich obtained their title to
the property by two quit claim deeds from Summit County on July 9,
1964, and April 15, 1965.

Summit County had previously, in 1915

and 1940, obtained title by Auditor's Tax Deeds resulting from
tax sales in 1910 and 1935.

The second deed from the County was

given to correct a slight error in the description on the first
deed (R.62).
Mr. Butkovich took a bulldozer on the property and blocked
off entrances, drove in stakes and tied ribbons on trees to mark
the boundaries, and put up "no trespassing" signs.

He also cleared

brush off the ground and leased the property to United Park City
Mines Company for use as a ski run (R.62-63, Exh.20).
The plaintiff, Colman, received a deed to the property in 1968
from a Robert T. Banks.
kind to Banks.

However, there was no conveyance of any

Upon learning of the claim to Butkoviches to the

property, Colman filed this action praying for a decree quieting
title in him.

Following a trial and an appeal the Supreme Court

ordered Colmanfs complaint dismissed with prejudice and held that
the deed, which conveyed the property here involved from Summit
County to Butkoviches, was valid.

The Supreme Court's decision
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was based upon the lack of any chain of title to Colman and on
the established validity of the conveyance to Butkoviches.
A more complete statement of facts and the entire chain of
title leading up to the conveyances to both Colman and Butkoviches
is contained in Appellantsf Brief filed in the prior appeal of
this case, Case No. 13868, and in the court's opinion therein,
appearing in Colman v. Butkovich,

Utah 2d

, 538 P. 2d

188 (1975).
Following the decision of the Supreme Court, the Butkoviches
filed a motion in the lower court requesting an order dismissing
the plaintiff's complaint and quieting title to the property in
the Butkoviches.

At the hearing on this motion Summit County,

though not a party to this action, appeared in court to inform the
court that it desired to claim title to the property.

The lower

court thereupon ordered Butkoviches to join Summit County as a
third-party defendant in order that it might assert its claim to
the property.

Summit County was joined and filed a counterclaim

asserting that it had superior title to the property and that the
title of the Butkoviches was void (R.248,232).
Butkoviches then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
1) estoppel by deed, 2) equitable estoppel, 3) Summit County
conveyed its entire title to Butkoviches, since the conveyances
to and from Summit County used the same description, and 4) any
title acquired by Summit County inures to the benefit of its
grantees, the Butkoviches (R.243).

There was no dispute of any

facts relating to these claims and, therefore, the lower court
granted the motion for summary judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The appellant's statement of facts is disputed in the
following respects:
1)

The statement, on page 2, as to the auditor's certification

on the assessment rolls is not supported anywhere in the record.
2)

The deed descriptions

on pages 2 and 3 are not complete

since they leave out the location as being in Summit County and
the reference to the sale for delinquent taxes against the prior
owners, D. C. McLaughlin Estate and Park City Townsite, which
refers to only one possible tract of land.
3)

The reference on page 3 to other transactions and prior

negotiations with Summit County are irrelevant and accuse
Mr. Butkovich of dishonesty with no basis in fact.
4)

The references on page 3 to the deeds to and from Secutiy

Title Company are irrelevant and do not accurately state where the
description on those deeds came from.
5)

The conversation quoted on page 4 does not establish

Summit County's claim that Mr. Butkovich included all unclaimed land
in the general vicinity--nor does anything in the record.
6)

The statement on page 4 that the surveyor testified he

could not locate the property described on the deed to Butkoviches
is false.

He testified that he could locate it (R.33-34) as did

an abstractor and attorney who also testified (R.90-91,95-96).
7)

The statements on page 5 that the Supreme Court rejected

Butkoviches1 claim of title to the property is false.

This court

specifically stated at 538 P. 2d 190:
"The trial court, for some reason, emphasized what
we think was an unwarranted conclusion that defendants1
(Butkoviches) document of transfer from Summit County,
namely, the County Deed, had a vague description.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Expert testimony was to the effect that the
description closed at a border line of Park
City Townsite, by a well-known and commonly
used abbreviation of MP.C." to describe the
townsite situate in Summit County."
This court also said in its opinion that "Summit County obtained
unquestioned title to the property for nonpayment of taxes, and
sold it . . . to Butkovich in 1964."

The references to Summit

County as the owner related only to the time prior to the sale
to the Butkoviches.

ARGUMENT
Since Summit County inserted itself into this lawsuit and
attempted to challenge the title of the Butkoviches, this Court
must first consider the question of whether Summit County has any
right to challenge that title.

This argument will, therefore, first

consider that question and show why Summit County is barred from
making a claim because of estoppel by deed, equitable estoppel, and
because Summit County conveyed everything it had to Butkoviches and
any after-acquired right of Summit County inures to the benefit of
the Butkoviches.

Thereafter, the points raised in appellant's

brief will be countered.
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POINT I
SUMMIT COUNTY HAS NO RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE
TITLE OF THE BUTKOVICHES.
A.

SUMMIT COUNTY, AS THE GRANTOR
IN THE DEED TO THE BUTKOVICHES,
IS ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING ITS
OWN DEED AND DENYING THE TITLE
OF ITS GRANTEES.

Summit County conveyed the property here involved to the
Butkoviches in 1964 by quit claim deed.

In doing so Summit County

transferred any interest it held in that property to the Butkoviches.
If there is anything about that conveyance which is improper, it
is not the right of Summit County to challenge it.

This principle

of estoppel by deed is well-established in the law and provides
that a grantor is "estopped from denying the title of his grantee
or his own authority to sell or convey/1 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel
and Waiver, §10.

This principle operates even if the deed itself

is invalid as is claimed by the appellant here.

In Daniell v.

Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1410 (Fla. 1950), the court
held at 23 A.L.R. 2d 1417 that "regardless of the invalidity of
the tax deeds, and the untruth of their recitals, the State of
Florida, the grantor therein, is estopped to question the validity
of such deeds and the truth of their recitals."

In that case the

tax deeds from the State of Florida were invalid because title
to the property was held by the United States at the time of the
tax assessment and sale by the State.
2d 1416,

The court stated, at 23 A.L.R.

"the United States, or any purchaser from the United States

other than the State of Florida would be entitled to challenge the
validity of the tax deeds . . . ."

This principle is established
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in numerous cases, many of which are discussed in the annotation,
Estoppel of United States, state or political subdivision by deed
or other instrument, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1419.
The purpose of this principle of the law becomes obvious
when considered in light of this case now before the court.

Summit

County has not challenged anything about its sale of this property
to the Butkoviches.

There is no question raised about fraud,

misrepresentation, or unfairness of the price.

Summit County is

now attempting to challenge its own deed only because it wants the
property back, undoubtedly, because of an increase in value in
recent years.

It would be grossly unfair to allow such a challenge

and the principal of estoppel by deed exists to prevent it.

B.

SUMMIT COUNTY IS BARRED BY EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL FROM CHALLENGING THE TITLE OF
THE BUTKOVICHES BECAUSE OF ITS LEVY,
ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF TAXES FOR
ELEVEN YEARS AND BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE
TO REFUND OR OFFER TO REFUND THE TAXES
COLLECTED ON THE PROPERTY.

After conveyance of this property to the Butkoviches in 1964
Summit County assessed and collected taxes thereon each year thereafter.

Its present rash attempt to retake the property is barred

by the principle of equitable estoppel.

A party who comes into

a court of equity to quiet title to property is bound by the maxim,
"He who seeks equity must do equity."

That this principle also

applies to governmental entities is also established by Daniell v.
Sherrill, supra, at 1416-17.

There also the state acquiesced in

the possession and improvement of the property, collected taxes
on the property over many years, and failed to refund or offer to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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refund the taxes collected.
M

The court stated at page 1417,

We further hold, in addition to the technical or legal estoppel,

that the facts in this case raise an equitable estoppel against
the State."
Summit County's failure to do equity in this case, after its
acquiescence in possession and collection of taxes over many years,
raises an equitable estoppel against the County.

There is no reason

why the County should not be held to the same standards required of
its citizens.

C.

SUMMIT COUNTY IS BARRED FROM
CHALLENGING THE TITLE OF BUTKOVICHES
BECAUSE IT RETAINS NO INTEREST IN
THE PROPERTY, HAVING CONVEYED EVERYTHING IT OWNED TO THE BUTKOVICHES.

The title to the property involved in this case was obtained
initially by Summit County by auditor's tax deeds.

The property

had previously been assessed with taxes and upon nonpayment by the
owners, tax sales resulted and the property was conveyed to Summit
County in the annual

fl

MayM sales.

The history of these assessments

and tax sales appears in the abstract of title in evidence (Exh.ll)
and in the summaries of the chain of title also in evidence (Exh.llA
and 11B).

The important thing to note is that the legal description

on the deeds from Summit County to the Butkoviches is precisely
the same as the legal description used on the assessment notices,
tax notices and auditor's tax deeds to the County.

Therefore, the

question of the vagueness or validity of the legal description on
the deed to the Butkoviches does not benefit the County at all.
If the description on the deed to Butkovich is vague rendering the
Howard
W. Hunter Law Library, J.on
Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
deed void,Digitized
thenby the
the
description
the
auditor's
deed to the County
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is vague, rendering it void, since the descriptions on both were
precisely the same.

If the auditor's deed to the County is valid,

then the deed to the Butkoviches is valid, giving the Butkoviches
title to the property, again because the descriptions on both deeds
were precisely the same.

Since the County has conveyed all the

interest it received in this property, whatever that interest might
be, it retains no title to this property and has no right to
challenge the title of the Butkoviches.

D.

ANY INTEREST ACQUIRED BY SUMMIT COUNTY,
AFTER ITS DEED TO THE BUTKOVICHES, INURES
TO THE BENEFIT OF THE BUTKOVICHES.

Summit County has argued in its brief that the decision of
this Court in Colman v. Butkovich, supra, in some mysterious way,
held that title to this property is in Summit County, even though
Summit County was not a party to that action.

It is true that there

are two references in that opinion to Summit County as the owner
of the property.

In both instances, however, the reference is to

the title held by Summit County after the tax deeds to the County,
resulting from failure to pay taxes, and prior to the conveyance
of title by the County to the Butkoviches in 1964.

Of course, the

County had title then and, as this court stated at 538 P. 2d 189,
it was "unquestioned title". There is no holding anywhere in that
opinion that Summit County now holds title.
However, should Summit County obtain any title to that property
after its deed to the Butkoviches, whether by reason of this court's
decision or by any other means, that title inures to the Butkoviches.
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This principle of after-acquired title is also well established
in the law.

It is stated in 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, §294 as

follows:
"A grantor who executes a deed purporting to
convey land to which he has no title or to
which he has a defective title at the time of
the conveyance will not be permitted, when he
afterward acquires a good title to the land,
to claim in opposition to his deed as against
the grantee or any person claiming title under
him. This rule is applicable even though the
deed was by way of gift."
This principle also applies to governmental entities as is
again shown by Daniel! v. Sherrill, supra, at 1418.

POINT II
THE FILING OF AN UNDERTAKING REQUIRED BY SECTION
63-30-19, U.C.A., DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE AND
THE REQUIREMENT WAS WAIVED BY SUMMIT COUNTY SINCE
IT WAS NOT ASSERTED IN ITS ANSWER.
Summit County, in Point I of its brief, has taken what seems
to be a ludicrous position.

The County appeared in court, while

not a party to this action, and without notice or invitation, and
literally demanded to be made a party so it could assert a claim
to the property involved in the action.

The court complied and

ordered the Butkoviches to join the County as third-party defendants.
Now the County suggests that the third-party complaint should have
been dismissed because no undertaking was filed as required by
Section 63-30-19, U.C.A.

How is the County to assert its claim

if the third-party complaint is dismissed?

The Butkoviches would

have preferred to leave the County out of the suit but joined
the County at its request as ordered by the court.

That order of

the court was questionable and could undoubtedly have been successful
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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challenged on appeal.

If the County wanted to assert an interest

in the property, why shouldn't it file its own complaint or file
a complaint in intervention in this action?

In fact the Butkoviches

would have no objection at all to a dismissal of the County since
they had no reason to join the party from whom they obtained their
deed, for the reasons set forth in Point I of this brief.

It is

obvious that under these conditions, Section 63-30-19, U.C.A., does
not apply.
However, the County waived any right it had to invoke Section
63-30-19, U.C.A., because it failed to assert that defense in its
answer which was filed long before its belated and untimely Motion
to Dismiss, which asserted that section as an afterthought.
Section 63-30-16, U.C.A., also a part of the act requiring the
filing of an undertaking, provides that actions brought under the
Act shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 12("

of those Rules provides:
M

A party waives all defenses and objections
which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply, except . . . ."
(Certain defenses not applicable here).
Rule 12 obviously calls for the filing of a motion prior to
the filing of an answer and if a defense, other than those excepted
in the rule, is not asserted in that prior motion or in the later
answer, it is waived.

Summit County has therefore waived its

claimed defense.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SUMMIT COUNTY
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO DISPUTE AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT.
In Point II of its brief Summit County has argued that the
motion for summary judgment was granted in error.

However, no

reference is made to any material fact about which an issue exists.
Rather the argument claims only that the lower court, in a previous
trial, while Summit County was not a party, held that the deed to
the Butkoviches was void and that the Supreme Court held that the
County held title.

The County has completely ignored the fact that

this court reversed the decision of the lower court with respect
to the validity of the deed to the Butkoviches.

The decision of

the Supreme Court was very specific on that point when it stated,
at 538 P. 2d 190:
"The trial court, for some reason, emphasized
what we think was an unwarranted conclusion
that defendants' (Butkovich) document of
transfer from Summit County, namely, the County
Deed, had a vague description. Expert testimony
was to the effect that the description closed
at a border line of Park City Townsite, by a
well-known and commonly used abbreviation of
"P.C." to describe the townsite situate in Summit
County."
This part of the opinion quite clearly overturns the
"unwarranted" decision of the lower court and expressly upholds the
validity of the deed to the Butkoviches.
The County's claim that this court held that the County held
title has been adequately refuted in Point 1(D) of this brief.
Suffice it to say that the language in the opinion to the effect
that Summit County had unquestioned title before its conveyance
to the Butkoviches,
does
give
theClarkCounty
any claim to the property
Digitized by the Howard
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now--some twelve years after its conveyance to the Butkoviches.
The undisputed material facts in this case appear in the
Findings of Fact as follows (R.253):
"7. That whatever title to the property
here involved may have been held by Summit
County was conveyed to the defendants
Butkovich by deeds from Summit County in
1964 and 1965.
"8. That since 1964 Summit County has assessed
and collected taxes on the property here
involved and has not refunded or offered to
refund any of those taxes."
These facts were already in evidence in this case and are
not contested by the County.

The only issues to be resolved were

legal issues and for this purpose summary judgment is appropriate.
The lower court, therefore, properly concluded that Summit County
was estopped from challenging its own deeds, was equitably estopped
from challenging the defendants1 title because of its failure to
do equity, and had conveyed its entire rights to the property to
Butkoviches and retained no rights therein.

POINT IV
THE VALIDITY OF BUTKOVICHES1 TAX TITLE IS NOT
RELEVANT IN THIS PROCEEDING. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR
TAX TITLE IS VALID AND THEIR PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
IS ADEQUATE. IF THEIR TITLE IS VOID, SO WAS THE
COUNTY'S TITLE.
Summit County's challenge to the validity of the title of
the Butkoviches, in Point III of its brief, is irrelevant because
of Summit County's lack of standing to challenge their title, as
established in Point I of this brief.

Furthermore, Summit County

is barred by the statutes of limitations in §§78-12-5.1 and 5.2,
U.C.A., which bar any action or defense against the holder of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tax title unless the party bringing the action or asserting the
defense has had possession of the property within four years of
such action.

Summit County has not had any possession of this

property and makes no claim to it--at any point in time.

This

challenge by the County should, therefore, not even be entertained
by the court.
Furthermore, the County's claim that the description is void,
if true, would invalidate its own title.

As set forth in Point 1(C)

above, the description on its assessment notices and the auditor's
tax deed to the County was exactly the same as that on its deed to
Butkoviches.

If one is void for vagueness, so is the other.

The

County is, therefore, attempting to invalidate the title it had
but has since conveyed.
As to the claim that the deed to Butkoviches is void, the
County only rehashes the assertions of the plaintiff Colman in the
prior appeal of this case.

Nothing new appears in this appeal and

the County's argument should be adequately disposed of by Point II
of Appellants' Reply Brief on the prior appeal.

Without repeating

the argument appearing there, the following points should be
considered.
The case of Burton v. Hoover, 93 Utah 498, 74 P. 2d 652 (1937),
relied on by the County on this point, held that the failure to
designate the township and range in the legal description resulted
in a defective title.

That case has been limited, however, by

the later case of Keller v. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P. 2d 318
(1943), which considered the failure to designate the township
"North" and the Range "West" not fatal where the location in Box
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Elder County must of necessity be "North" and "West11.

The court

took judicial notice of such facts.
The County also relies on Howard v. Howard, 12 U. 2d 407,
367 P. 2d 193 (1962), in which a metes and bounds description in
a deed was missing the last two courses and the acreage, if the
missing courses were implied, was only half what the deed stated
it to be.

There were numerous other confusing defects in the deed

and the court held it void because it was impossible to determine
what the grantor intended.

The court stated, however, that "the

grantor's intention should be given effect if reasonably determinable,
The facts in that case have nothing in common with those here.
The County further relies on the old California case of
Scott v. Woodworth, 34 C.A. 400, 167 Pac. 543 (1917), which held
a description too vague where no westerly boundary was given, nothing
was stated from which it could be inferred, the described southerly
boundary did not exist and the described north and east boundaries
were actually on the west.

The court further held that the

document involved was not, and was not intended to be, a deed.

Again

the facts in that case having nothing in common with those here.
The suggestion made by the County that the description in the
Butkovich deed does not close and has no westerly boundary is simply
not true.

Quoting from pages 11-12 of Appellants1 Reply Brief on

the prior appeal of this case:
"The description here, property in Summit
County, Utah, to wit: "all unplatted land in
this Block (29 P.C.) and all land West of this
Blk." with reference to the sale for delinquent
taxes against the prior owners, D. C. McLaughlin
Estate and Park City Townsite, refers to only
one possible tract of land. The designation
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M

P.C. M is a standard, well-known
abbreviation for property in the Park City
Townsite in Summit County (Tr. 90-91), and
such abbreviations Mhaving local significance11
are authorized by §59-11-6, U.C.A. This
property description does not run West Mto
the Pacific Ocean, to the West line of Utah,
Summit County or to the summit of the next
mountain" as Colman so facetiously suggests
[as Summit County also suggests, also
facetiously]. It obviously runs to the West
boundary of the Park City Townsite. There is
only one Block 29 in the Park City Townsite
and only one Park City Townsite in Summit
County, Utah. Ownership in all the property
West of the Park City Townsite was in the
United States Government and was therefore not
assessed (Tr. 88-90). There were no surrounding
landowners to be confused by this description.
It could not apply to any other land. Ferguson
v Ma this, 96 Utah 442, 85 P. 2d 827 (1938);
relied upon by Colman, held the description of
the property involved to be sufficient and not
misleading and relied upon testimony of numerous
witnesses that the alleged faults in the description were common parlance and that there was no
other land in the County to which this description would apply. This is also true here.11..
If this argument is not sufficient to establish the point,
then the stare decisis or res judicata effect of this court's
decision on the prior appeal in this case should dispose of the
matter.

Again, this court held that the lower court's conclusion,

that the description was vague, was ''unwarranted" and pointed out
that "expert testimony was to the effect that the description closed
at a border line of Park City Townsite, by a well-known and commonly
used abbreviation of 'P.C.' to describe the townsite situate in
Summit County."

It should be noted that the County's brief quotes

testimony and facts from the transcript in the prior appeal of this
case, all of which was before this court then.

No new facts are

present here, nor could any be introduced, to warrant any different
conclusion than was reached there.
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POINT V
WHETHER OR NOT THE AUDITOR'S AFFIDAVITS WERE
ATTACHED TO THE ASSESSMENT ROLL IS NOT RELEVANT
HERE. FURTHERMORE, THAT ALLEGED FACT NOWHERE
APPEARS IN THE RECORD, WAS NOT BROUGHT BEFORE
THE LOWER COURT AND CANNOT BE BROUGHT BEFORE
THIS COURT.
The County has made the unsupported assertion in its brief
that the auditor's affidavit was not attached to the assessment
roll with respect to the property here involved.

This is the first

time in this case that this assertion has been made.
brought to the attention of the lower court.
in the record of this case.

It was not

It appears nowhere

The law and practice of this court

prevent a party from making such a claim for the first time on
appeal, especially where there are no facts in the record to support
the claim.

First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University,

U. 2d

, 544 P. 2d 887 (1975); Davis v. Mulholland, 25 U. 2d 56, 475 P.
2d 834 (1970).
Furthermore, the claim is irrelevant where the County has
failed to establish its standing to challenge the validity of the
Butkoviches title, as set forth in Point I of this brief, and where
the County is barred by the statutes of limitations, as set forth
in the first part of Point IV of this brief.

And to be repetitious,

if the deed to Butkoviches is void for lack of the auditor's
affidavit, the County's assessments, auditor's deed and title are als
void.

The County gains nothing by this irrelevant argument.
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CONCLUSION
This brazen attempt by Summit County to retake the
property it sold to the Butkoviches, after having conveyed its
entire interest to them and having collected the purchase price
as well as taxes assessed thereon from them over many years,
should be rejected by this court, as it was by the lower court.
The County has not shown, nor even alleged, any impropriety on
the part of the Butkoviches.

It seeks merely to claim for itself

the increased value of this property caused by inflation and
surrounding development in recent years.
Summit County has no right to challenge the title of
the Butkoviches because 1) it is estopped from challenging its
own deed, 2) it is estopped from seeking an equitable decree
quieting title when it has failed to do equity in offering to refund
the purchase price and all taxes paid, (3) it has conveyed the
entire interest in this property to the Butkoviches and retains
no title at all, and 4) any interest it retained or has since
obtained, inures to the benefit of its grantees.
County's arguments:

As to the

1) The statutory requirement of an undertaking

doesn't apply to this case where the County is, in effect, the
uninvited intervening party and has waived its right to assert
that defense by failure to include that defense in its answer.
2) Summary judgment was entirely proper since all of the facts were
in evidence, no material facts were in dispute and the Butkoviches
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

3) The validity

of the Butkoviches1 title is irrelevant in this proceeding but if
it was void, the County's title was likewise void.
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Howrever, the

tax title description was adequate because it could apply to
only one piece of property and no one was confused or misled by
that description, least of all the County who assessed the property
by that description.

4) The alleged failure of the auditor to

attach his affidavit to the assessment roll appears nowhere in
the record, is irrelevant, was not brought before the lower court
and canft be raised for the first time on appeal.

Therefore, the

summary judgment entered by the lower court was the only proper
decision that could have been made and should be affirmed by this
court.

Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK 6c MARSH
Ralph J. Marsh
Attorney for Respondents
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